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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH

:

PlaintiffiAppellee,

:

-vs.-

:

ALEKS ANDRE MALLAEV,

:

Case No. 98-0166 CA

Priority No. 2
Defendant/Appellant.

:

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT ALEKSANDRE MALLAEV

Defendant, by and through counsel, hereby submits this reply brief in response to the
State's brief filed on October 21, 1998.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Jury Instructions Prescribed an Order for Jury Deliberation and
Potentially Confused the Jury Deliberations
Defendant does not dispute the State's argument that jury instructions must be viewed

as a whole and that an individual jury instruction cannot be viewed in isolation. State's Br.
at 15-16. In the present case, Defendant does not try to isolate one jury instruction. Rather,
defendant simply showed that the trial court presented a series ofjury instructions that, even
when read together, dictate an order of deliberation and used confusing and contradictory
language. Indeed, as the State pointed out in its brief, the jury was provided a stapled packet
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ofjury instructions and instructed they could not remove the staple and take jury instructions
out of the apparent order in which they were provided to the jury. The jury instructions at
issue are 18, 19, 20. Jury Instruction No. 18 provides the following confusing statement:
The crime of criminal homicide (murder in the first
degree) charged in the Information in this ^ase, necessarily
includes the lesser offense of manslaughter, a second degree
felony.
If you find that the defendant in this case had committed
a criminal homicide but you have a reasonable doubt as to
whether or not it is murder or manslaughter, you must convict
him of manslaughter.
R. at 246. Normally, this jury instruction would be considered correct insofar as it declares
manslaughter to be a lesser included offense of criminal homicide. However, in the present
case, the issue revolved around the specific defense of extreme emotional distress
manslaughter. The Supreme Court stated in State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 869 (Utah
1998), that "extreme emotional disturbance manslaughter is not a lesser included offense of
the crime of murder." Because extreme emotional disturbance manslaughter was the only
issue at trial, the jury instruction is a misleading statement of law.
The jury then received Jury Instruction No. 19 that stated:
If, after careful consideration of all the evidence in this
case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one of the
foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must
find the defendant guilty of murder as charged in the
Information. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the following
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty.
2

R. at 247. The jury received one instruction that instructed it to consider manslaughter as an
alternative to murder if the murder elements were not established, and one instruction that
command the jury to acquit if the elements of murder were not established. Moreover, Jury
Instruction No. 20 on manslaughter included the following language:
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all
of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant. On the other
hand, if the evidence has failed to so establish one or more of
the foregoing elements, then you should find the defendant not
guilty.
R. at 248 (emphasis added). The jury received contradictory guidance between Jury
Instruction 18 and 19 and Jury Instruction 20. The first two commanded the jury to convict
defendant of manslaughter if the elements of murder were not established or to completely
acquit defendant if the elements of murder were not established. Jury Instruction No. 20 then
merely advised the jury that if the manslaughter elements were not established then the jury
"should" find defendant not guilty. The State seems to urge that Jury Instruction No. 26
clears all confusion, when read before Jury Instruction No. 18:
If you find from the evidence that the death of Michelle
Turner was knowingly and intentionally done, you may still find
the defendant only to be guilty of manslaughter. If you are
satisfied from the evidence that the prosecution has failed to
provide beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time of the
homicide, Mr. Mallaev was not acting from an extreme
emotional disturbance that was reasonably excused.
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R. at 254. However, the language of Jury Instruction No. 26 is confusing when read next to
Jury Instruction No. 18 because it offered the jury merely the option of convicting defendant
of extreme emotional distress manslaughter instead of the imperative language of Jury
Instruction No. 18 which required the jury to convict defendant of manslaughter if the
elements of murder were not established. This is particularly true given the context of the
trial in which, as the State reported in its brief, both the prosecutors and defendant's trial
counsel argued extensively the issue of the case; whether defendant suffered extreme
emotional distress when he stabbed Michelle Turner. See State Br. at 16.
Thus, read as a whole, the trial court first instructed the jury that manslaughter was
a necessarily included lesser offense to murder and that if the jury had a reasonable doubt
about murder, then the jury "must convict him of manslaughter."1

Jury Instruction No. 18,

R. at 246. The trial court then instructed the jury members that they "must find the defendant
guilty of Murder" if they were convinced of the murder elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
However, if they were not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, they had to find the
defendant not guilty. Jury Instruction No. 19, R. at 247. The jury was then instructed that
if the jury was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of manslaughter, then
it was "your duty to convict the defendant." Jury Instruction No. 20, R. at 248. While it is
important that the jury review the jury instructions as a whole, it is also equally imperative
1

Manslaughter that both sides at trial defined as extreme emotional distress
manslaughter which, as a matter of law, cannot be considered a lesser included offense of
criminal homicide. Piansiaksone. 955 P.2d at 869.
4

that the jury receive clear and consistent instructions to avoid "any possible
misunderstanding" that could arise during their deliberations due to jury instructions that
offer contradictory guidance. See State v. Gardner. 789 P.2d 273, 284 (Utah 1989), cert.
denied. 494 U.S. 1090 (1990).
The manner in which the jury instructions were presented to the jury and the different
jury instructions presented to the jury in the murder instruction and the manslaughter
instructions were inconsistent and confusing. Therefore, defendant's right to an impartial
jury consideration was prejudiced by the improper jury instructions given to the jury.
II.

Defendant Showed Significant Evidence to Support His Extreme
Emotional Distress Manslaughter Defense
The State attempts to isolate the extreme emotional disturbance of defendant to the

events of the morning in which the attack occurred. State's Brief at 18. However, the
surrounding facts and evidence of the trial established that defendant acted under the
influence of extreme emotional disturbance. All of the factors pointed to in the State's brief
reflect reactions from defendant to Michelle Turner's "cat and mouse" games with Michelle
toying with defendant's emotions. R. at 635. The State also described defendant as a person
with violent tendencies because Michelle's mother said that defendant had apparently shoved
Michelle a couple of times. R. at 866. Such a generalized inference can be made applicable
to most people since all people are to one extent or another "potentially violent." State's
Brief at 19. The State concludes its analysis by quoting Michelle's mother when she stated
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that she warned Michelle to be careful and that Michelle responded that she would be careful.
R. at 874-75. However, contrary to Michelle's statement, she acted the entire morning
preceding her death in a manner arguably careless by continuing to mock and tease defendant
and to act in a confrontational manner with defendant. R. at 610, 651. The facts and
evidence presented in the case show that defendant was acting under existing circumstances
which placed an extreme emotional burden upon him. The State incorrectly asserted that
defendant was merely taunted with a traffic ticket and that was the only consideration for the
circumstances to be considered for extreme emotional manslaughter. State's Br. at 18.
However, as the evidence showed throughout the record and pointed out in defendant's initial
brief, defendant was under extreme emotional distress based on a continuing series of
encounters and emotional "cat and mouse" games played by Michelle Turner. Accordingly,
the court improperly instructed the jury leading to possible confusion in the jury and
prejudiced defendant in his extreme emotional distress manslaughter defense.
III.

Defendant's Right to a Fair Trial Was Greatly Prejudiced When the Trial
Court Erroneously Admitted Laura Taylor's 911 Telephone Call
The State argues that defendant did not show that the probative value of the 911 tape

was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues.
State's Brief at p. 21-22. However, the case to which the State cites to for much of its
support; State v. Maurer. 770 P.2d 981 (Utah 1989), resulted in the reversal of the
defendant's conviction because the supreme court held that the trial court had improperly
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admitted into evidence a letter which the defendant apparently wrote to the victim's father
containing several very prejudicial statements against the defendant's interest.2
The Supreme Court in Maurer. in its analysis of Rule 403 prejudice, discussed
relevance under Utah R. Evid. 401 and stated "evidence is relevant if it has 'any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without evidence,'" Maurer. 770 P.2d at 983
(quoting Utah R. Evid. 401). In Maurer. the defendant and the State both agreed that the

2

The letter in question stated as follows:

3/10/85
To Mike Hannon,
Just a letter to let you know that I'm glad I killed Janet. 'Daddy's Little
Girl' is no more. You spoiled her rotten. Thank God you were not there that
morning. You might have prevented it. I hope you feel guilt over it.
It was a great feeling to watch her die. She kept crying Tt hurts, It
hurts'. I should hope so, I mean it was a 13 inch kitchen knife. Mike Bickley
got to watch her die too. It was great. Your daughter was nothing but a
whore, a fucking whore. Drifting from one man to another. She couldn't
break the engagement herself. No Daddy had to demand that she make a
decision. God she was 29 and couldn't function or live without you doing
everything for her.
So you had her buried in the Catholic section of the Salt Lake Cemetary
[sic]. After her having an abortion? You flicking cover up artists, I hope her
her [sic] death hurt you. Or are you relieved? What a stupid bitch she was.
She did everything in the relationship and I sat back and did very little. I love
it! She was so emotional and stupid. But basically a real whore. What are
you going to do now? Bring her back from the dead. You should have been
there that morning to prevent the murder. Hope you enjoyed your skiing that
day. The laughs [sic] on you.
The killer
John H. Maurer
State v. Maurer. 770 P.2d 981, 982 (Utah 1989).
7

central issue was what the defendant's state of mind was at the time he killed the victim. LdL
The supreme court determined that a portion of the letter was arguably relevant to show the
defendant's state of mind. Id Nevertheless, it held that the balance of the letter "contained
little or no relevance to the central issue." Id

Similarly, in the present case, the issue was

whether defendant acted under extreme emotional distress. Thus, the question for the trial
court was whether admitting the tape would show defendant's extreme emotional distress.
The Maurer court cited several cases, with approval, in which the courts disallowed
audio tape admissions similar in nature to the present case. In United States v. Laytom 767
F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1985), the Ninth Circuit upheld the trial court's determination denying the
government's attempt to admit "the last hour tape" of Jim Jones during the Jonestown suicide
to show that the statements made by Jim Jones in the tape were reflective of a conspiracy
with defendant. In that tape, screams of dying children were heard in the background while
the mass suicide was apparently taking place. The trial court had determined that '*[i]he
discussion of the impending mass suicide set against the background cacophony of innocent
children who have apparently already been given poison would distract even the most
conscientious juror from the real issues in this case." Layton. 767 F.2d at 556. The Ninth
Circuit further stated "the tape would tend to divert the jury's attention from the issues in this
case to a significant amount of extraneous matter. As a result, there would be a considerable
potential for unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues." Id at 556.
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The Maurer court also cited favorably to State v. Pendergrass. 586 P.2d 691 (Mont.
1978), in which similar to the present case, the victim made a telephone call immediately
following the alleged attempted robbery and sexual intercourse without consent. The Maurer
court stated that in Pendergrass. the " state had clear proof of rape without the tape, and there
was no necessity for or instructive value in its mission." Maurer. 770 P.2d at 986.
Similarly, in the present case, there was no necessity for the admission of the 911 tape
because there was no real question as to the fact that defendant stabbed Michelle. The
Supreme Court in Maurer went on to quote the Pendergrass opinion overturning the
admission of the tape stating:
Aside from any relevance heretofore pointed out, it [the audio
tape] contained emotional and nearly incoherent outpourings of
the victim in the immediate aftermath of a violent crime. These
utterances necessarily induced a feeling of outrage against the
defendant and sympathy for the victim. Undue prejudice against
defendant was created and a fair trial climate was destroyed by
this tape.'
Maurer. 770 P.2d at 986 (citing Pendergrass. 586 P.2d at 694). Similarly, in the present case,
there was no dispute that defendant killed Michelle Turner. Rather, the issue at trial was
whether defendant was suffering from extreme emotional distress at the time of Michelle's
death. Nothing in the 911 tape reflected defendant's emotional state. Instead, like the audio
tape in Pendergrass. the 911 tape reflected Laura Taylor screaming uncontrollably and was
very difficult to understand any of the statements made on her part which comments would
be the only factors to even potentially go to defendant's emotional state. Thus, the State's
9

assertion that there was no prejudicial value in admitting the 911 tape simply ignores the
state of the law in Utah.
The State also asserts that somehow, the 911 tape was admissible to allow the
prosecutor to "paint a factual picture of the context in which the events in question
transpired." See State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1210 n. 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The State
misplaces its reliance on this footnote in Morgan because that the "factual painting" to which
the Morgan footnote referred, was a history of prior acts or prior crimes in which to review
the case, not the contemporaneous activities that were testified to by several witnesses. The
State argues that only the events immediately preceding the attack would be properly
considered by the jury and this court in evaluating whether defendant was indeed under
extreme emotional distress. Yet, the State argues that although the prosecutors had already
painted the factual picture of defendant's attack and the events leading up to that attack
through its witnesses, one or two coats of paint were not sufficient for the State to cover the
facts and the State resorted to a paint ball splatter represented by admission of the 911 tape.
The Court's admission of the 911 tape flies in the face of the major function of Rule 403
which is to exclude "matter of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels
for the sake of its prejudicial effect... to permit the trial judge to preserve the fairness of the
proceedings by exclusion despite its relevance." United States v. McRae. 593 F.2d 700, 707
(5th Cir.), cert, denied. 444 U.S. 862 (1979).
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Accordingly, this Court should overturn the trial court's admission of the 911 tape
because it was substantially prejudicial to defendant's position and offered little or no
probative value.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons asserted herein and in defendant's initial brief, defendant's case
should be remanded for retrial.
DATED this £ 3

A

day of December, 1998.

Gregory G. Skoi^ras
Lloyd R. Jones
WATKISS DUNNING & SKORDAS, P.C.
Broadway Centre, Suite 800
111 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2304
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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